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ABSTRACT
Plato’s Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman 
exhibit several related dialectical methods 
relevant to Platonic education: maieutic in 
Theaetetus, bifurcatory division in Sophist and 
Statesman, and non-bifurcatory division in 
Statesman, related to the ‘god-given’ method 
in Philebus.  I consider the nature of each 
method through the letter or element (στοιχεῖον) 
paradigm, used to reflect on each method.  At 
issue are the element’s appearances in given 
contexts, its fitness for communing with other 
elements like it in kind, and its own nature 
defined through its relations to others.  These 
represent stages of inquiry for the Platonic 
student inquiring into the sources of knowledge.
Keywords: method, metaphysics, epistemology, 
ontology
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I. INTRODUCTION
While Plato’s Theaetetus, Sophist, and States-
man dialogues bear clear narrative and dramatic 
kinships, the relationship of the philosophical 
methods depicted in each is unclear.1 The two-
day period of discussion in which the dialogues 
are set begins with Socrates’ maieutic inquiry 
into the views of the young mathematician The-
aetetus and concludes with the Eleatic Stranger’s 
diairetic account of the statesman as a determi-
nate moment in the care for the human com-
munity. This dramatic procession raises many 
questions, such as those of why Plato chose to 
link together dramatically these dialectical exer-
cises, whether and how one method or dialogue 
acts as a proleptic anticipation of another, and 
what sense, if any, we can make of their unity.2
In what follows, I seek to offer the beginning 
of an answer to these by arguing that Plato’s tril-
ogy exhibits a series of related methods of inqui-
ry into the sources of knowledge, representing a 
set of dialectical exercises relevant to a Platonic 
education and the increasing philosophical ma-
turity of the student.3 These methods include 
the maieutic method depicted in the Theaetetus, 
the method of bifurcatory division initiated in 
the Sophist and partially continued in the States-
man, and the method of non-bifurcatory divi-
sion employed by the Stranger in the second half 
of the Statesman.4 Since the Stranger does not 
make the aim of this final method clear, I will 
here consider it with reference to the method of 
inquiry described in the Philebus and referred to 
in the literature as the ‘god-given method.’5 
It is difficult to track these large shifts in lim-
ited space. To understand these methods and 
their relation to one another, we will here follow 
the guidance offered by the paradigm of letters 
or elements (στοιχεῖα) in each instance.6 Plato 
frequently has his primary interlocutors make 
epistemological moves with reference to let-
ters, including in key moments in the Republic, 
and the speakers draw on this paradigm in the 
dramatic moments in the near vicinity of each 
methodological change in the trilogy.7 Thus the 
letter paradigm offers a fixed point of orienta-
tion for considering the nature of each of the 
three methods.8 At issue in these changes are, 
among other things, the notion of the element 
as part, its role in composing a whole, its rec-
ognizability as such, its appearances in given 
contexts, its fitness for communing with other 
elements like it in kind, and its own nature as 
defined by its relations to others like it in kind.
Ultimately, I argue that the methodological 
changes in the trilogy map onto three senses of 
account (λόγος) through which knowledge is 
attained. These roughly correspond to the three 
senses of account at issue late in the Theaetetus 
(Theait. 206 d 1 - 208 d 9). In his final defini-
tion of knowledge, Theaetetus hypothesizes that 
knowledge is “true opinion with an account” 
(Plat., Theait. 201 c 8.)9 Socrates then consid-
ers three possible senses of ‘account,’ which, I 
argue, correspond to the methodological moves 
made throughout the dialogues composing the 
trilogy. The first type of account Socrates con-
siders is that in which one makes “one’s thought 
apparent vocally by means of words and verbal 
expressions […] like reflections upon water 
or in a mirror” (Plat., Theait. 206 d 1-4). This 
type of account is closely related to the maieutic 
method in the Theaetetus, insofar as the task in 
maieutic is to externalize the internal by reflect-
ing thought in an account, exposing it in its na-
ture and presenting it for scrutiny. At issue in 
the Sophist and Statesman will be the latter two 
types of account that Socrates identifies. The 
second is the account that entails “being able, 
when questioned about what a thing is, to give 
an answer by reference to its elements” (Plat., 
Theait. 206 e 10 – 207 d 2), which will be at stake 
in the non-bifurcatory divisions of the States-
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man. The third, “being able to tell some mark 
by which the object you are asked about differs 
from all other things” (Plat., Theait. 208 c 8-9), 
anticipates the aim of the Stranger in practic-
ing bifurcatory division in the Sophist and early 
Statesman.10 I suggest that these three types of 
account represent three stages of inquiry for the 
student of Platonic philosophy inquiring into 
the sources of knowledge and her means of no-
etically grasping them with reference to parts 
constitutive of wholes and co-constituted by 
other parts like them in kind.
II.  MAIEUTIC IN THE 
THEAETETUS
In the Theaetetus, the interlocutors seek 
a satisfying account of knowledge through 
Socrates’ familiar question and answer process. 
Socrates here acts in the role of the midwife, and 
he reflects on the maieutic method (Plat., Theait. 
149 a 1 – 151 d 5) by describing it as helping 
the interlocutor to make progress by “discover-
ing and bringing forth many beautiful things 
themselves out of themselves” (Plat., Theait. 
150 d 5-9).11 This corresponds to Socrates’ later 
consideration of one sense of account as making 
“thought apparent vocally by means of words 
and verbal expressions […] like reflections upon 
water or in a mirror” (Plat., Theait. 206 d 1-4). 
He describes the ‘birthing’ process as leading to 
the subsequent test of the result in terms of its 
truth or falsity (Plat., Theait 150 c 1-5). In these 
ways, the maieutic method entails externalizing 
the internal by submitting the internal to an ac-
count, and hence to scrutiny. With these goals 
in mind, Socrates limits his involvement to 
helping to give birth to the ideas of Theaetetus, 
rather than revealing his own.12 Thus Theaetetus 
is responsible for the hypotheses that direct the 
discussion, while Socrates is responsible for un-
packing the entailments of each hypothesis. In 
other words, Socrates uses the maieutic method 
as a means of assisting the interlocutor in the 
production of the account already implicit in 
the interlocutor’s own thinking.
The maieutic method used in the dialogue 
contrasts with a discussion of mathematical 
knowledge early in the text. This discussion 
points beyond itself to the next step necessary 
after maieutic, although the interlocutors will 
not take it up until the dramatically later dia-
logues. In his discussion of mathematical pow-
ers (Plat., Theait. 147 d 3 – 148 b 4), Theaetetus 
describes his goal of understanding the oneness 
inherent in many mathematical objects and ac-
counting for the objects with reference to this 
oneness. This is what he calls the attempt to 
“gather together [the powers in question] into 
some one [term], [to] which we could address 
our speech”.13 In other words, Theaetetus’ goal 
in this mathematical study is to understand 
many in terms of their sameness, or to account 
for the one inherent in many. But Theaetetus 
ultimately fails to find a way to turn this math-
ematical method of gathering and sorting into 
an account of the means by which knowledge 
is attained.
The maieutic method is useful insofar as 
it acts as a propaedeutic to more systematic 
studies. The seeming aporia inherent in the 
dialogue’s conclusion is in fact provocative of 
further considerations, and suggests ways in 
which Socrates’ three conceptions of ‘account’ 
anticipate the turns taken the next day in the 
Sophist and Statesman.14 The key to allowing the 
aporia to provoke further studies lies in con-
sidering the moves that Socrates and Theaete-
tus make after hypothesizing that knowledge 
is “true opinion with an account”. Here we will 
consider the letter paradigm, which arises in the 
context of spelling and the recognition of syl-
lables and letters as one of several examples that 
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Socrates and Theaetetus take up in seeking to 
understand the senses in which a thing can be 
known.15 Socrates asks Theaetetus to consider 
the spelling of his own name (Θεαίτητος) and 
establishes that knowledge of the spelling of 
Theaetetus’ name is easily demonstrated by one 
who is able to lay out the letters of the name in 
its correct order. He asks Theaetetus, though, to 
consider the case of the person who can spell 
‘Θεαίτητος’ but misspells ‘Θεόδωρος’, replacing 
the theta with a tau (Plat., Theait. 207a 8 – 208 
c 3). Socrates demonstrates that this misspelling 
of the second name shows that the speller in fact 
did not know how to spell ‘Θεαίτητος’, but in-
stead merely had the right opinion regarding the 
spelling, since the speller could not reproduce 
the spelling of the same first syllable (‘Θε-’) in 
the new context of a second name. This invokes 
the senses of right opinion and knowledge at 
play in Socrates’ description of the divided line 
analogy in the Republic, where ‘right opinion’ 
is guided by partial or mediated access to the 
source and ‘knowledge’ entails a direct noetic 
grasp of the source.
Socrates’ observation here points to latent 
positive content in the conclusion of the The-
aetetus. Knowledge of a thing, here the spelling 
of the name ‘Θεαίτητος’, entails the recognition 
of the major component parts of the thing in all 
of their manifestations. In other words, grasp of 
the object of knowledge sought here, the name, 
has only occurred when the name’s syllables, 
and the letters that compose them, are recog-
nized in every instance. Knowledge, we thus 
have learned, entails an account of the sameness 
inherent in the constitutive elements of wholes, 
which are themselves both a one (as a whole) 
and many (as comprising elements). That is, 
‘Θε’ is a one, in that it is one thing that can be 
known, and hence an object of a sort of knowl-
edge. But it comprises parts, ‘Θ’ and ‘ε’, and 
hence is many; recognition of it thus requires an 
understanding of its parts. 
The maieutic method entails treating each 
entity as a whole. In other words, to give birth 
to one’s thinking into an account entails begin-
ning with a given concept, articulating it, and 
interrogating the structure of the concept as it 
has appeared from out of one’s pre-discursive 
thinking. This in itself is valuable, because 
things manifest themselves to us as unified sin-
gulars (ones) that require deeper analysis to be 
captured in their essentiality, or, in other words, 
captured in an account of their manifold being 
(insofar as they are many). It furthermore en-
tails a process of developing and examining the 
account, testing it for strengths and weaknesses 
before allowing it to be assessed as a true insight 
or a wind egg. But the maieutic method stops 
short of offering a means of proceeding from the 
given entity qua the unified whole in which it 
presents itself into an account of the thing qua 
complex object structured by determinate ele-
ments. An employment of it does not clarify the 
ways in which these elements commune with 
other elements that are outside of it and like 
it in kind. Because the maieutic method does 
not have a mechanism by which sameness and 
difference between things can be accounted, it 
has shown itself to be insufficient for attaining 
knowledge in the strictest sense and hence to 
serve as a proleptic exercise for further studies.
We see this when we consider that the an-
swer to the question, ‘How does one spell the 
name “Θεαίτητος?”’, cannot be ensured to de-
rive from knowledge and not right opinion in 
the senses that Socrates distinguishes in the 
divided line analogy in the Republic. Knowl-
edge of the spelling of the name ‘Θεαίτητος’ 
is only attained when each of the component 
parts is understood in its own nature. The 
speller who cannot recognize the elements in 
other settings, as in the case of the same letter 
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and same syllable in the different setting of the 
name Θεόδωρος, has not grasped the nature of 
the elements in the initial instance. Hence the 
speller has neither knowledge of the elements 
nor of the whole. Likewise, one who knows the 
individual letters composing the name does not 
have knowledge of the spelling of Theaetetus’ 
name until she can order the letters properly 
relative to an understanding of the nature of the 
name.16 Put differently, Theaetetus is unable to 
apply the urge to assimilate many into oneness 
through an account in the case of non-mathe-
matical objects of knowledge in the manner in 
which he gathered together the mathematical 
powers into oneness. If he is to make progress 
in the next day’s investigation, Theaetetus will 
need a means of doing this. In these ways, the 
letter paradigm points to the next step necessary 
toward a more robust and exhaustive account of 
the source of knowledge.
III.  BIFURCATORY DIVISION 
IN THE SOPHIST AND 
STATESMAN
In the Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger becomes 
heir to Socrates’ discourse from the preceding 
day. In this change, the role of the midwife is 
replaced by that of the dialectician. The maieu-
tic method entails the midwife (e.g., Socrates) 
aiding the interlocutor in the production of the 
account already implicitly operative in the in-
terlocutor’s own thinking. An important shift 
happens here insofar as the Stranger’s methods, 
bifurcatory and non-bifurcatory division, are 
oriented by receptivity. That is, the move from 
maieutic to diairesis entails a refocusing of the 
direction of the inquiry from the midwife sup-
porting the productive interlocutor to the inter-
locutors receiving and accounting for the nature 
of the world.17 This is reflected in the shift of fo-
cus from the first to the second and third senses 
of account in the Theaetetus, which are oriented 
around the account-giver in the first instance 
and the nature of the object in the second and 
third instances.
In the Sophist, the interlocutors seek to dis-
close the essence of the sophist, as well as the 
paradigmatic example of the angler, through 
bifurcatory division. This entails splitting the 
proposed kind in two, always keeping to the 
right hand part of the section and holding fast 
to the community to which the kind belongs 
until stripping away all of the kind’s common 
features and leaving it in its indwelling nature 
(Plat., Soph. 264 e 9 – 265 a 1). 18 Hence, in the 
paradigmatic example, the angler is divided 
relative to binary halves before being shown to 
be the expert in getting, and specifically the ma-
nipulative hunting of animals, and specifically 
wetland-dwelling fish, who strikes by hooking 
in daylight from below (Plat., Soph. 221 b 3 – c 
2). Reflecting on method elsewhere, the Strang-
er describes bifurcatory division as entailing 
the isolation of “one form extended everywhere 
through many things” by establishing difference 
among objects through taking up a single one 
(e.g., hunting) as a coherent, immediately intu-
itable whole.19 This whole is then divided into 
parts (e.g, hunting by night and hunting by day) 
that are themselves further divisible. In doing 
so, the whole is disclosed with reference to the 
binary halves that compose it, and its essence is 
articulated through an account of the halves in 
which it is has a share, discarding those in which 
it does not.
Elsewhere in the Sophist, the paradigm of 
letters again arises to signal reflection on the 
method at hand and anticipate ways in which 
its method of accessing the sources of knowl-
edge is in some sense insufficient (Plat., Soph. 
253 a 1-9). In the dialogue’s central digression, 
the Stranger considers the need for accounts of 
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the elements themselves, with reference to the 
ways in which a given element is or is not fit 
for blending with other elements. The Stranger 
argues that master of the art of spelling knows, 
for example, that some letters are fit by nature 
to blend with others (e.g., ‘s’ and ‘t’), that some 
letters are necessary for ‘binding’ all letters to-
gether (i.e., vowels), and that some letters re-
quire others for their instantiation and cannot 
be voiced on their own (i.e., the mute conso-
nants). In other words, knowledge of the parts 
of the word entails more than recognition across 
instances, as in the case considered in the The-
aetetus, but rather the deeper account of the na-
ture of each part.
The need for blending of elements for self-
instantiation is analogous to the insight that 
forms require one another for their own instan-
tiation. The five great kinds – being, motion, 
rest, sameness, and difference (Plat., Soph. 251 
d 6 – 256 c 9) – are required in all instances, 
and only by partaking in some combination of 
these great kinds can any form present itself to 
discourse.20 That is, in their discursive intelligi-
bility all forms require being to be themselves, 
sameness insofar as they are self-same, differ-
ence (e.g., non-being, which the Stranger estab-
lishes as a form of difference at Plat., Soph. 257 b 
3 – 259 b 7) insofar as they are not other forms, 
etc.21 Thus, the interdependence of a form on 
other forms has been established, at least in a 
preliminary way that will require elucidation 
later.
The reflection on letters helps illuminate 
what bifurcatory division can and cannot ac-
complish. Like the maieutic method in the 
Theaetetus, bifurcatory division allows distinct 
wholes to manifest themselves as unities to be 
understood. Unlike the maieutic method, bi-
furcatory division allows a thing to be disclosed 
with reference to its elements. In this way, this 
method has begun to fulfill the promise articu-
lated by Socrates in the Theaetetus to deliver an 
account by which true opinion could be orient-
ed. This is related specifically to the third kind 
of account Socrates considers in the Theaetetus: 
“being able to tell some mark by which the ob-
ject you are asked about differs from all other 
things” (Plat., Theait. 208 c 8-9). In other words, 
this account is useful insofar as it discloses the 
form under investigation with reference to its 
participation in difference.22
But the consideration of letters and the iden-
tification of the great kinds suggest the need for 
developing further methods by which knowl-
edge can be established. Bifurcatory division 
lacks a means of yielding an understanding of 
the nature of the object qua parts and wholes 
and their fitness for combination. Such an ac-
count, as the analogy of letters shows, would go 
beyond simply displaying the elements in their 
order, and entails a further inquiry into their 
constitution with reference to the character of 
the parts composing them as a whole.
We should be concerned that the elements 
themselves have not, in all instances, been fully 
disclosed in their nature upon their division. 
For example, we can say of ‘animal hunting’ that 
it constitutes half of the notion of ‘hunting’, but 
little else. If we seek a robust account of the ways 
in which a given element lends itself to com-
muning with other elements, we need to know 
more about the nature of the element itself. In 
this way, the goal of knowing the whole with ref-
erence to a full account of its parts has not been 
fulfilled and the account is incomplete.
Furthermore, as bifurcatory division contin-
ues into the Statesman and the object of knowl-
edge changes from the sophist to the statesman, 
the divisions become less precise. With Socrates 
the Younger replacing Theaetetus as the Strang-
er’s interlocutor, the Stranger initially makes 
clear that he will proceed in the manner of the 
previous dialogue at Plat., Polit. 258 b 1-8. But 
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in the initial division in which the interlocutors 
seek an account of the statesman, the bifurcato-
ry method (Plat., Polit. 258 b 1 – 267 a 3) causes 
the interlocutors to falter, forces digressions, 
and ultimately leads to a ‘joke’ (Plat., Polit. 266 
c 1).
Starting at Plat., Polit. 258 b 1, the initial 
bifurcatory division of the statesman begins in 
the manner of the Sophist before Socrates’ the 
Younger’s disproportionate division of animals 
into human and non-human animals (Plat., 
Polit. 262 a 4-7) causes the Stranger to reflect 
on the proper method of proportionate division 
and the philosophical value of cutting in two 
(Plat., Polit. 261 e 1 – 264 b 8). When the bifur-
catory division continues, the Stranger makes 
the sudden and jarring suggestion that there are 
in fact two possible paths (Plat., Polit. 265 a 4-7), 
both of which yield confusing and unsatisfying 
‘diagonal’ motion. When the ultimate results 
entail the statesman “running around with the 
herd” and “having kept up in the race with the 
one among men who for his part is the most ex-
cellently trained for an easily managed life,” the 
Stranger deems that the divisions have yielded a 
“laughable” account (Plat., Polit. 266 b 3 – c 1).
IV.  NON-BIFURCATORY DIVISION 
AND THE ‘GOD-GIVEN 
METHOD’
The Stranger will soon (at Plat., Polit. 287 b 
3) alter his method of division in the pursuit of 
the statesman in response to the laughable ac-
count. The groundwork for the shift begins to 
be laid in the preceding myth of ages. In the 
myth, the Stranger describes the current state 
of the cosmos, in which the care for human 
community is no longer the job of the gods, but 
instead is that of the human community itself. 
Hence the paradigm that the Stranger then be-
gins to draw upon is ‘care’ (ἐπιμέλεια, Plat., Polit. 
276 d 1-4), and specifically care for the human 
community.23 
The guidance of the care paradigm will ulti-
mately help the Stranger to come to the final ac-
count of the statesman. Prior to this, the Stranger 
leads Socrates the Younger through a digression 
on dialectic that informs the change of method 
leading to the final account.24 He considers the 
value of paradigms in inquiry with reference to 
letters and their ability to help young learners of 
spelling find their way from the known to the 
unknown, stating that recognizing letters brings 
young learners back
…first to those cases in which they were 
correctly judging these same letters, and, 
while leading them back, set[s] alongside 
them the ones not yet recognized, and 
by throwing them side by side to indi-
cate that there’s the same similarity and 
nature in both intertwinings, until the 
letters that are truly judged have been 
shown as juxtaposed with all the ones 
about which there’s ignorance, and hav-
ing been shown, thereby becoming para-
digms, bring it about that each one of all 
the letters in all the syllables is always 
addressed on the same terms with itself: 
as other when it’s other than other letters, 
and same when it’s the same (Plat., Polit. 
278 a 8 – c 1).
The Stranger concludes that in this way 
a paradigm through which an object can be 
known is derived “when what is the same in 
something other that’s sundered from it is cor-
rectly judged;” this allows the learner to bring 
to completion “one true opinion about each of 
them as about both together” (Plat., Polit. 278 c 
3 – 5). This suggests steps beyond those indicat-
ed in the Theaetetus and Sophist, as the Strang-
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er here discusses letters as a means of passing 
from opinion to knowledge through study of 
the unknown with reference to the known. That 
is, the nature of the unknown is here described 
as accessible by means of the known, suggest-
ing the ways in which an understanding of the 
known letter guides the learner into an under-
standing of the nature of that which is presently 
unknown. 
With these notions established, and fol-
lowing the guidance of the care paradigm, the 
Stranger proceeds to divide in a non-bifurcatory 
manner. He says little about this new method, 
stating only that they will now “divide limb by 
limb, like a sacrificial animal, since we don’t 
have the power to do it by two,” cutting “with 
an eye to the number nearest” (Plat., Polit. 287 c 
3-6). In other words, the process of dividing will 
no longer yield binaries, but instead will make 
the number of cuts appropriate to the thing be-
ing cut. The notion of ‘limbs’ suggests that these 
divisions will be in response to the specific na-
ture of the thing being divided, instead of the 
uniform bifurcatory cuts.
The exact nature of the final inquiry into the 
statesman (from 287 c 9 to the dialogue’s con-
clusion at 311 c 5) has been debated.25 I follow 
the interpretation worked out by Mitchell Miller 
in a series of articles in which Miller interprets 
the set of final divisions as a non-bifurcatory 
diairetic account of the form of care for the hu-
man community in fifteen cuts, each an inde-
pendent moment within the spectrum of care 
bounded on each end by those arts attending to 
the material and spiritual needs of the commu-
nity. These include the seven productive (or in-
directly responsive) arts related to the material 
life of human community: producers of (1) raw 
materials, (2) tools, (3) containers, (4) vehicles, 
(5) defenses, (6) amusements, and (7) nourish-
ment (Plat., Polit. 287 c 9 – 289 c 2). These are 
followed by the one productive and directly re-
sponsive art, (8) slavery (Plat., Polit. 289 c 3 – d 
1). Finally, by this interpretation the Stranger 
identifies the seven directly responsive arts at-
tending to the spiritual life of the human com-
munity: (9) merchants and traders, (10) heralds 
and clerks, (11) priests and diviners, (12) rheto-
ricians, (13) generals, (14) adjudicators, and 
finally, (15) the statesman (Plat., Polit. 289 e 2 
– 290 e, 303 b 9 – 305 e 5). 
This interpretation hinges on an under-
standing of the middle term, (8) slavery, as en-
tailing a mix of indirect and direct care, insofar 
as slaves are both goods and agents, and both 
passively used to meet needs qua possession 
and actively engaged in the human community 
qua human agent.26 In this way, the division is 
neither bifurcatory nor trifurcatory, but instead 
yields a unified spectrum bounded by these two 
distinct poles. In other words, each art is situ-
ated relative to the material and spiritual needs 
in care for the human community to different 
extents, and the balance between a given art’s 
care for material and spiritual needs positions it 
relatively among the others. 
Importantly, this has yielded an account of 
these elements insofar as they are constituted by 
one another in their mutual relations to the two 
extremes of the material and spiritual needs of 
the human community by which they are de-
fined. In this way, the non-bifurcatory division 
undertaken here has yielded a spectrum, where 
each point represents an instance of limit, the 
identity of which is defined by the points of 
limit elsewhere on the same spectrum. Each of 
these points of limit thus indicates a ratio be-
tween, at the far end, concern with the material 
life of the city, and on the near, concern with the 
spiritual life of the city, with slavery positioned 
at the midpoint where the two extremes are in 
balance. This maps on to Socrates’ second type 
of account from the Theaetetus, where Socrates 
had described the account in which one is able 
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to answer the question of what a thing is “by ref-
erence to its elements” (Plat., Theait. 206 e 10– 
207 a 2). 
The Stranger says little about his intentions 
in changing methods midway through the 
Stateman. A consideration of the “god-given 
method” that Socrates describes in the Philebus, 
which seems to describe a process of coming 
upon knowledge through means similar to the 
non-bifurcatory divisions in the Statesman, will 
help to give content to the method and also to 
use the letter paradigm to reflect on these dia-
lectical methods in one more important way.27 
At Plat., Phil. 16 c 8 – 17 a 4, Socrates speaks 
in praise of the ‘finest way’ of investigating by 
means of a “gift of gods hurled down from heav-
en by some Prometheus along with a most daz-
zling fire”.28 Socrates explains:
…whatever is said to be consists of one 
and many, having in its nature limit and 
unlimitedness. Since this is the structure 
of things, we have to assume that there 
is in each case always one form for every 
one of them, and we must search for it, as 
we will indeed find it there. And once we 
have grasped it, we must look for two, as 
the case would have it, or if not, for three 
or some other number. And we must treat 
every one of those further unities in the 
same way, until it is not only established 
of the original unit that it is one, many 
and unlimited, but also how many kinds 
it is. For we must not grant the form of 
the unlimited to plurality before we know 
the exact number of every plurality that 
lies between the unlimited and the one. 
[…] Nowadays the clever ones among us 
make a one, haphazardly, and a many, 
faster or slower than they should; they 
go straight from the one to the unlimited 
and omit the intermediates. It is these [in-
termediates], however, that make all the 
difference as to whether we are engaged 
with each other in dialectical or only in 
eristic discourse. (Plat., Phil. 16 d 1 – e 
2, 17 a 1-5).29
Let us note several similarities between 
Socrates’ opaque account here in the Philebus 
and the Stranger’s non-bifurcatory division in 
the Statesman. First, Socrates says again here 
that the goal when using this method is to un-
derstand the whole with reference to twoness, 
threeness, or any number appropriate to the 
nature of the thing under investigation, as was 
the case in cutting the sacrificial animal with an 
eye to the number nearest. Second, the claim 
that “whatever is said to be consists of one and 
many” has “limit and unlimitedness” maps di-
rectly onto the structure of care for the human 
community that the Stranger articulated in the 
Statesman. For there, care for the human com-
munity was shown to be one (care) and many 
(a set of fifteen determinate moments). Fur-
thermore, care for the human community was 
shown to be unlimited (insofar as it entails an 
unlimited dyadic spectrum between care for 
the material life and spiritual life of the city) 
and yet also have limit (the fifteen determinate 
points within that spectrum in which the condi-
tions of the spectrum generate intelligible mo-
ments of care).30 In other words, care is one and 
many, and unlimited and limited. Furthermore, 
Socrates’ emphasis on “the intermediates” (τὰ 
μέσα, Plat., Phil. 18 c 3 – d 1) echoes the key 
move in the Stranger’s analysis of care; for there 
the Stranger moved from the analysis of produc-
tive arts to directly responsive arts upon identi-
fying their midpoint, slaves, which clarified the 
two poles of the unlimited dyadic spectrum. In 
this way, the Stranger’s account was able to rise 
to the level of true “dialectic” (Plat., Phil. 17 b 6 
and Plat., Polit. 285 d 5).31
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We can do some work to understand this 
new method by considering Socrates’ examples 
in the Philebus. Socrates helps his interlocutors 
Protarchus and Philebus to grasp this method 
through two examples: the scale of musical tones 
and the discernment of vocalic sounds that are 
represented independently by letters (Plat., Phil. 
17 b 3 – 18 d 2). Here he initially notes that “the 
sound that comes out of the mouth is one […] 
but then it is also unlimited in number;” thus 
“if we know how many kinds of vocal sounds 
there are and what their nature is, that makes 
every one of us literate” (Plat., Phil. 17 b 4-7). In 
the case of musical sounds, the one of the form 
‘tone’ is defined with reference to each pitch re-
siding on that tone. Thus, an understanding of 
(e.g.) C sharp is attained with reference to C (as 
a lower tone) and D (as a higher tone). Under-
standing C and D, thus, entails understanding 
C flat (B) and C sharp, and D flat and D sharp, 
respectively. In this way, knowledge of tones as 
determinate points of limit along the indeter-
minate spectrum of tones entails understand-
ing each of the many in its nature, and the ways 
in which each nature proceeds from the nature 
of the spectrum and its defining points on this 
spectrum. 
In the case of tones, Socrates moves from the 
one (tone) to the many (the number of tones in-
stantiated on the tone spectrum). In his second 
example, that of the vocalic sounds creating let-
ters, Socrates describes the discovery of the let-
ter spectrum by the Egyptian Theuth (Plat., Phil. 
18 b 6 – d 2) as an example of proceeding from 
the many (vocalized sounds) to the one (the vo-
calic sound spectrum).32 Socrates explains that 
Theuth discovered 
that the vowels in that unlimited variety 
are not one but several, and again that 
there are others that are not voiced, but 
make some kind of noise, and that they, 
too, have a number. As a third kind of 
letters he established the ones we now call 
mute (ibid). 
That is, Theuth divided vocalic sounds into 
three categories: the voiced, the unvoiced but 
sounded, and the mutes. These he then subdi-
vided based on the number appropriate to the 
kind of each. Here the spectrum is bounded 
on the one side by voiced letters (the vowels), 
the intermediate letters that are unvoiced but 
sounded, and the mutes.
Importantly, Socrates notes that Theuth “re-
alized that none of us could gain any knowledge 
of a single one of [the letters], taken by itself with-
out understanding them all” (Plat., Phil. 18 c 8 – 
d 2). In other words, a letter is only understood 
in its nature when the co-constitutive parts like 
it in kind have been understood in their own na-
tures. Thus the method of non-bifurcatory divi-
sion has provided a way of understanding each 
element in its nature with reference to the other 
elements that situate it and define its character 
as such. And the consideration of this distinc-
tion with reference to letters points to an im-
portant takeaway regarding the method when 
we return our attention back to the account of 
care for the human community. For this sug-
gests that something like material production 
of raw goods is understood only when it is ap-
prehended with reference to the other points that 
constitute its being on its particular spectrum. 
In other words, no one determinate moment of 
care is without the other determinate moments 
by which it is co-constituted; likewise, it cannot 
be known in the fullest sense prior to being un-
derstood in its context within the spectrum of 
care. Thus, analyses of, e.g., the letter Eta, or C 
natural, or the art of producing raw goods, will 
fail when they are conducted only with refer-
ence to these elements as such. Instead, it is only 
when these elements are understood as points 
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of limit within their co-constitutive many and 
the one that comprises the many can the ele-
ments be known and analyzed.
V. CONCLUSION
To conclude and take stock of where our in-
vestigation of these methods has taken us, let us 
review our steps with reference to the notion of 
the letter. In the consideration of the Theaete-
tus we encountered the provocative suggestion 
that one only knows the spelling of a word (e.g., 
‘Θεαίτητος’, or, more precisely, the first syllable 
of this word, ‘Θε’) if one recognizes its compo-
nent parts when they appear elsewhere (e.g., 
the appearance of the first syllable in the name 
‘Θεόδωρος’, or, more precisely, both parts com-
posing the many that is the one syllable ‘Θε’). We 
saw that in the Sophist the Eleatic Stranger both 
seeks to understand with reference to structure 
and argues that knowledge of a concept (here a 
letter) entails an account of the further concepts 
(letters) like in kind with which the element is 
fit to mix. In the Statesman, the Stranger indi-
cates the ways in which known letters can direct 
the learner toward not-yet-known letters by al-
lowing the learner to begin to grasp the nature 
of the unknown through its fitness to combine 
with other known elements like it in kind. This 
process further reveals previously concealed as-
pects of the known to the learner as well, inso-
far as it draws out newly revealed aspects of the 
known element’s nature. In the account of the 
‘god-given method’ in the Philebus with refer-
ence to its application in the non-bifurcatory 
division in the Statesman, we saw that Socrates 
uses letters to explain that knowledge of a con-
cept (letter as vocalic sound) is derived only 
when its situation among all the other concepts 
(i.e., the other letters) to which it owes its com-
position has been understood. Our knowledge 
of the constitutive structure of the form has 
provided insight into the being of the form as a 
one and as a many, both limited and unlimited. 
This understanding of the one as subjected to 
both an unlimited plurality and a limited many 
through the imposition of limit represents a fur-
ther nuance offered by the dialectical methods 
that unfold over the course of the trilogy. The 
unity of these methods that has emerged from 
our consideration of these methods can act as 
a provocation towards further considerations of 
the Platonic education, and aid in the turning of 
our souls from becoming to being as Socrates 
describes in the central books of the Republic.33
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NOTES
1 The three dialogues take place in a two-day period, 
probably in spring 399 BCE as argued at Nails 
2002, 320. The trilogy is situated definitively within 
Socrates’ life by Socrates’ mention of his plans to 
meet the summons of Meletus later on the day of 
the Theaetetus, setting the dialogues in the months 
before his trial. It bears noting that the exchange 
depicted in the Euthyphro, set outside of the King’s 
Archon’s court, occurs between the Theaetetus and 
the Sophist and Statesman on the following day. 
For a discussion of the dramatic and philosophi-
cal connections between the Euthyphro and this 
trilogy, see Wiitala 2014, passim. Furthermore, it 
has been argued that the Cratylus might also have 
been set on the day of the trial, e.g. by Sallis 1996, 
225-230. Others, e.g. Nails 2002, 312-313, argue that 
the Cratylus is in fact set some two decades prior. 
In any event, we should notice that the conclusions 
and apparent aporia of other dialogues, including 
at least the Euthyphro and maybe the Cratylus, give 
further context to the progress made between the 
Theaetetus and the Statesman. I will not develop 
this point here, but it should be remembered that 
philosophical methods are employed here under 
the dramatic backdrop of Socrates’ impending trial 
and execution, including that the philosopher had 
not properly been differentiated from the sophist by 
the citizens of Athens. Thus the methods are given a 
political and historical framework as well.
2 For a general overview of proleptic in Platonic 
dialogues, see Kahn 1988, passim, but especially 
541-542 and 547-549. 
3 This is not a claim about Plato’s development, but 
instead a claim about the relationship between dia-
logues independent of the chronology of their com-
position. I generally take it that Plato’s dialogues 
are intended as pedagogical exercises for students 
of the academy, not expositions of doctrines, and 
hence assume that these methods are intended for 
pedagogical purposes.
4 In this paper I follow Ambuel 2007 38-39, and 
Miller 2016, 6 in reading only division, and not 
‘collection and division’ as is often named in 
the literature, at play in Sophist and Statesman. 
Sayre 2006, 36-37 offers a helpful discussion of 
the terminology and the absence of ‘collection’ 
(sunagōgē) in ‘titular’ references to division in the 
Sophist and Statesman (i.e., Plat., Soph. 235 c 8 and 
253 d 1; Plat., Polit. 284 a 4 – 5 and 286 d 9). Miller 
argues that ‘collection and division’ is a term im-
ported from the Phaedrus (Plat., Phaid. 266 b 4-6) 
and not clearly at play in the “Eleatic” dialogues. 
Ambuel argues that collection cannot be at play 
in the Sophist due to an unresolved ambiguity 
between appearance and reality. Other commenta-
tors have argued that collection is at play in the 
Sophist; see, e.g., Bluck 1975, 33-40, Notomi 1999, 
2 fn. 75, and Ionescu 2013, passim. Cornford and 
Klein each hold middle positions, as Cornford 
argues that collection is not at play in the method 
of the interlocutors but is nonetheless exhibited 
throughout the movement of the text (Cornford 
1935, 171), while Klein  
holds that each articulation of the preceding  
divisions counts as a collection (Klein 1977,  
14ff).
5 E.g., in Miller 1990, passim.
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6 Other discussions of the role of letters in the 
dialogues include Gómez-Lobo 1977, Miller 1992, 
Notomi 1999, Gill 2006, Sanday 2015a, and Smith 
2018.
7 For example, Socrates situates his city-soul analogy 
in the Republic with reference to small and large 
letters (Plat., Rep. 368 c 7 – d 7) and its grammatical 
aspect with reference to the recognition of letters 
(Plat., Rep. 379 a – d). 
8 For the interpretation of Platonic paradigms that I 
follow, see Sanday 2017, passim, and Smith 2018. For 
the conflicting view that the notion of paradigms 
changes in different dialogues, see Gill 2006, 
passim.
9 Theaetetus describes this account in hazy terms, 
and Socrates later characterizes it as a ‘dream’ 
(Plat. Theait. 201 d 9), suggesting that the defini-
tion derives from a hazy and pre-discursive source. 
For a thorough account of the implications of this 
account’s ‘dreamlike’ status, see Burnyeat 1970, pas-
sim. For the influential challenge (given in 1952 but 
unpublished until 1990) to the view that knowledge 
of forms could be at play in the dream theory, see 
Ryle 1990, passim. Ryle’s view is rebuked by Lesher 
1969, passim and Miller 1992, especially 87-90.
10 Other commentators have also suggested that 
Socrates’ dismissal of his descriptions of ‘account’ 
are not as definitive as they might initially seem. 
Gómez-Lobo 1977, 31, and Desjardins 1981, 11, both 
argue that these definitions foreshadow elements 
in the “Eleatic” dialogues. Miller 1992, especially 
94-104 and Miller 2016, especially 321-322, also 
discusses the ways in which the final two senses of 
‘account’ in the Theaetetus correspond to the meth-
odology in the Sophist and Statesman.
11 Theaetetus translations taken from Sachs unless 
noted otherwise. Consistently throughout this 
paper I replace ‘articulation’ with ‘account’ in 
translating ‘λόγος’. I follow Fine 1979, passim in 
interpreting Plato’s use of ‘λόγος’ as stronger than 
that entailed merely by the English ‘statement’. For 
further discussion of interpretations of ‘λόγος’ in 
Plato’s writing, see Burnyeat 1990, 136-149.
12 Snyder 2016, passim has recently done work to show 
that Socrates’ midwife role in the Theaetetus entails 
Socrates’ use of epistemic failure to increase the 
efficacy of his methodology. Snyder argues that the 
bi-product of this experience is creating, within 
his interlocutors, wisdom regarding the use of this 
method to generate a sort of provocative aporia 
(Snyder 2016, 8). These points are helpful to consider 
the positive gains of this method, that is, the impor-
tant step of aporia that acts as a provocation toward 
further investigations.
13 With minor alterations to Sachs’s translation. In 
this way, Theaetetus demonstrates that he has not 
made the final step of knowledge of mathemati-
cal objects to knowledge of forms described in the 
middle books of the Republic.
14 As mentioned above, commentators who have ar-
gued this include Gómez-Lobo 1977, 31, Desjardins 
1981, 11, Miller 1992, especially 94-104 and Miller 
2016, especially 321-322. For a helpful discussion 
of the Theaetetus’ ‘ending well,’ see Haring 1982, 
passim.
15 Spelling is at issue in various ways throughout this 
passage, but is discussed explicitly at Plat., Theait. 
202 e 7 – 204 a 9, 206 a 3-8, and 207 a 8 – 208 c 4.
16 Here I am using my own example of moving from 
parts to whole to maintain the letters example. 
Socrates’ analogous example at Plat., Theait. 207 a 
4 is the description of the wagon as “wheels, axle, 
box, poles, crossbar”. For without an account of the 
inner-workings of these parts, we have merely a 
heap of parts, or a heap of letters in my example.
17 Whether division entails discovery or demonstra-
tion has been a debated subject since antiquity. 
Crombie 1963, 2:382 articulates an influential argu-
ment that the method is concerned with demon-
stration, not discovery. Here I follow Ionescu 2013, 
passim, who argues that division entails discovery 
(acquisition) and can take up objects of knowledge 
ranging from images to forms, corresponding to the 
objects of knowledge discussed in the divided line 
analogy.
18 Sophist and Statesman translations are taken from 
the Brann, Kalkavage, and Salem editions, with 
minor modifications noted.
19 This explanation comes in the midst of the 
Stranger’s description of what exactly the dialecti-
cian discerns, from Plat. Soph. 253 d 5 – e 3, which 
has been notoriously divisive among commentators. 
Here the Stranger says that the diairetic dialectician 
“…has an adequate perception of one form (εἶδος) 
extended everywhere through many things, each 
of which lies apart, and also many forms which are 
other than one another and are embraced by one 
external to them; again, he perceives one unified 
form composed of many wholes as well as many 
forms marked off as entirely apart. But to know this 
is to know how to discern, according to kind, where 
each is able to commune and where not” (Plat., 
Soph. 253 d 7 – e 3, substituting ‘form’ for Brann, et 
al.’s term ‘look’ in translating ‘εἶδος’, to use the term 
consistently with previous renderings above.) These 
lines have been interpreted as (i) a description of 
collection (d 5 – 7) and division (d 7 – 9) respec-
tively, as by Cornford 1953 and Sayre 2006; (ii) an 
anticipation of the discussion of the five greatest 
kinds, as by Gómez-Lobo 1977; (iii) as something of 
a hybrid (albeit earlier) version of (i) and (ii), as by 
Stenzel 1964; and (iv) as pointing both to non-bifur-
catory division (d 5 – 7) and bifurcatory division (d 
7 – 9), as by Miller 2016. I remain agnostic on this 
issue here due to spatial limitations, but suggest that 
my interpretation does not hinge on a commitment 
or lack thereof to any of these lines of  
interpretation.
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20 It bears noting that the Stranger does not claim 
that this list of five great kinds is exhaustive. It 
is possible that there are others. Plato’s character 
Parmenides in his eponymous dialogue describes 
likeness, unlikeness, oneness, and multitude (Plat., 
Parm. 129 d 2 – 130 b 8) in such a way as to suggest 
that these kinds are co-constitutive of forms in a 
similar way; but I lack the space to develop this con-
nection here. For more on this possibility, see Miller 
1986, especially 176-185, and Sanday 2015a, espe-
cially 154-165. Regardless of the list of great kinds, 
the important takeaway here is that structure of a 
given form requires its participation in other forms, 
and an understanding of a given form requires an 
account of the ways in which its nature requires 
participation in other forms.
21 For a discussion of the senses in which forms have 
been understood to be in motion and a novel inter-
pretation of the communing of forms as the sense of 
motion, see Wiitala 2018, passim.
22 The value of bifurcatory division in Platonic educa-
tion has been debated. Crombie 1963 and Ryle 
1966 both argue that the method is valuable only 
to philosophical amateurs, while Brown 2010, 168 
argues that although the method is unsuccessful 
in the Sophist (since sophistry is not a techne but is 
instead amorphous) it remained a viable method for 
students in Plato’s academy. For discussions of the 
value of non-bifurcatory division and its relevance 
to Platonic metaphysics, see Miller 1999, Ionescu 
2014, and Ionescu 2016.
23 For more on the ways in which the myth of ages 
prepares the way for the digression on method (Plat. 
Polit. 277 a 2 – 287 b 2) and the role of the care 
paradigm in the subsequent non-bifurcatory divi-
sion, see Ionescu 2014, especially 42-45, and Ionescu 
2016, especially 95-99. For more on the role of 
paradigms in the dialogue, see Sanday 2017, passim 
and Smith 2018, passim.
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